Spring Break
Mulgrew asks Professor Zaller 11 questions on Iraq, throws gauntlet
By: William Mulgrew
Issue date: 5/26/06 Section: Ed-Op
Originally published: 5/26/06 at 10:02 AM EST
Last update: 5/26/06 at 10:01 AM EST
Originally published: 5/26/06 at 10:02 AM EST
Last update: 5/26/06 at 10:01 AM EST
4. Another goal of insurgents is to cause instability by instigating sectarian outrage, closing down government services and attacking infrastructure. Yet in spite of threats, kidnappings, deaths and sabotage, nearly all of Iraq's schools are now open for the education of 8.5 million children and young people. By January of this year, all of Iraq's 600 state-owned hospitals and clinics remained open. By December of 2006, Iraq will achieve its OPEC quota of 2.8 million barrels of oil a day. The World Bank estimates that as much as 81 percent of Iraqis have access to clean water. Electrical output is 25 percent above pre-war levels. If, as Zaller writes, "the situation in Iraq is deteriorating," why do these developments suggest the opposite?
The Saddam menace
5. Zaller asserts that since no-fly zones frustrated Saddam Hussein's reach, he "was no menace to the United States or any other nation" and that "no military intervention was necessary to contain him." He writes this despite the fact that Saddam's regime made an assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush and funded anti-Israeli terrorist groups, ties to al Qaeda notwithstanding. David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, concludes in a report, "I actually think this may be one of those cases where [Saddam's regime] was even more dangerous than we thought," and, "We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities," which were part of "deliberate concealment efforts." Charles Duelfer, who headed the ISG after David Kay, states in a report, "Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution." Which is better strategically, removing Saddam and his regime from power before they had WMD capability or waiting until they had such capability?
The Saddam menace
5. Zaller asserts that since no-fly zones frustrated Saddam Hussein's reach, he "was no menace to the United States or any other nation" and that "no military intervention was necessary to contain him." He writes this despite the fact that Saddam's regime made an assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush and funded anti-Israeli terrorist groups, ties to al Qaeda notwithstanding. David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, concludes in a report, "I actually think this may be one of those cases where [Saddam's regime] was even more dangerous than we thought," and, "We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities," which were part of "deliberate concealment efforts." Charles Duelfer, who headed the ISG after David Kay, states in a report, "Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution." Which is better strategically, removing Saddam and his regime from power before they had WMD capability or waiting until they had such capability?
Anonymous
posted 5/27/06 @ 4:16 AM EST
Great to read an article from a more positive angle every ones and awile!
Regards,
Marcel Heersema
http://iraqi-dinar.blogspot.com